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BLUE POWER: THE THREAT OF THE MILITANT POLICEMAN
WILLIAM C. KRONHOLM
The author is a newspaper reporter and at the time of preparation of this article a student at the
University of Oklahoma. The article was prepared under the auspices of Professor Samuel G. Chapman, Department of Police Science, University of Oklahoma, and analyzes a growing trend in some
police organizations.

There has been much written in both the popular and scholarly press of the student activist and
the black militant. Both have been defined, catalogued, explained, promoted, and condemned.
But little has been written about another type of
militant, one significant not because of his numbers but because of his position. He is an official
of our government, one endowed with the public
trust, and the one with perhaps the greatest claim
on the title "public servant." He has only recently
emerged, in part as a reaction to the more widely
known activist. And, probably most troublesome,
he is apparently widely accepted by both the public
and many of his peers as the solution to acknowledged and important problems. He is the militant
policeman.

In general it seems that two types of militant policemen have emerged. One is the officer who sees
in his job, either consciously or unconsciously, the
possibility of fulfilling or working toward the fulfillment of a political or ideological goal. The second type seems more common and more altruistically motivated, but still can cause serious problems. He is the one who sees lawful restraints on
police power, whether right or wrong, as unnecessary formalities which may be ignored in order to
"do his job."
The militant policeman is still a tiny minority.
But he is far from insignificant, for he can cause
damage far out of proportion to his numbers. For
this reason, he must be recognized and understood
by administrators and dealt with before he becomes a major power.
That militant policemen are here and now is
readily evident in the formation of the Law Enforcement Group (LEG) in the New York City
Police Department in 1968. It was originally organized, without sanction of the New York Police
Commissioner, in the 80th Precinct in Brooklyn,"
1 Fox, "Leary Says Police Reflect Community in a
Swing to Right," N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1968, at. 1

when officers circulated a petition demanding the
removal of Criminal Court judge John F. Furey
from the bench for allegedly giving his tacit approval to the disruptive tactics in court of two
Black Panther suspects. 2 Before long, however, the
petition drive became an organizing drive. A list
of seven demands were circulated through all New
York precincts. The major demands were for a
grand jury investigation of supposed "coddling"
of criminal suspects in Furey's and other Criminal
Courts, and the abolition of the department's
Civilian Review Board. A LEG spokesman, also
said it would "contact and wholeheartedly support
the United States senators who are trying to prevent another Warren Court." 3
It appears that the LEG was a militant faction
of New York's Patrolmen's Benevolent Associa-

tion, and it chose to involve itself in politics. In
some inspecific manner, the LEG was connected
with the attack on September 4, 1968, on a group
of Black Panthers on the sixth floor of Brooklyn
Criminal Court. The New York Times' David
Burnham reported that about 150 white men,
swinging blackjacks, descended on the Panthers.
"Many," he said, "were off-duty and out-of-uniform policemen. ...

At least two ...

are on the

4
executive board of the Law Enforcement Group."
Whether the beating was a function of the new
group or was a spontaneous reaction to which the
LEG members were sympathetic is of little consequence. The militant action had the same results.
The heads of two Panther leaders were bloodied,
and another complained of being shoved down and
kicked, twenty or twenty-five times in the back.
And, according to Burnham, one of the injured
Panthers later grimly promised revenge while
fingering his bullet-laden bandolier.

2

Zion, "Rights Groups Assail Demands of New

Police Unit," N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1968, at 16.
3 Id.

' Burnham, "Off-Duty Police Here Join in Beating
Black Panthers," N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1968, at 1.
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New York Police Commissioner Howard R.
Leary offered an explanation for the appearance
of a militant right wing, but did not hint at a solution. Mr. Leary said the emergence of the rightest
groups was a reflection of a similar swing to the
right in the community at large. "They are responsive to what they believe the community
wants," Leary said. 5 Only three days later, New
York Patrolman Michael P. Churns, a director
of LEG, promised that members of the organization "would continue to mobilize the police and
the public in the fight against crime despite the
threat of expulsion from the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association." Chums also told reporter
Burnham that LEG Was not "'a right-wing organization, not a radical organization. We simply
are endeavoring to weld the public and police into
a single New York and national organization that
is anti-crime and pro law and order.'" 6 What
Chums did not say, and perhaps does not even
recognize, is that the term "pro law and order" is
going to mean very different things depending on
to whom he is speaking. It has become a political
stance, not a statement of ideals.
LEG is not the only problem in New York. The
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association, which is considered by no means as militant as LEG but
which becomes involved in political matters on
occasions, has issued at least one directive to its
membership, about 99 per cent of the force, which
could be interpreted as militant. On August 12,
1968, president John Cassese instructed officers
"that if a superior told them to ignore a violation
of the law, they should take action notwithstanding that order." 7 On its face, the directive sounds
good. However, as a task force of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence points out, it can subvert the control of the
administrator in potentially explosive situations.
Under the directive, the administrator cannot
order his men not to shoot looters during embryo
racial disturbances and be sure of obedience. The
directive could, in some situations, turn a relatively minor disturbance into open warfare.
New York is not the only city with militant
police problems, as Mayor Carl Stokes of Cleveland could point out. On July 23, 1968, there was
5

Fox, supra note 1.
Burnham, "New Police Group Maintains Stand,"
N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1968, at 61.
7
6

J. SKOLuicK, THE PoLTcs Or PROTEST: A STAFF
REPORT To TH
NATIoNAL CoM.nsioN ON TEm

CAUsES AND PREVENTiON or VIOLENCE, 207 (1969).

a gunfight between police officers and black militants. Stokes, a Negro, was blamed by many
policemen. During the next few weeks, the police
bands crackled with occasional obscene references
to the mayor and his picture appeared frequently
on station bulletin boards with the caption:
'Wanted for Murder." 8
Stokes' problems with the police have continued
and are continuing. When the mayor ran. for reelection in 1969, for example, about 400 off-duty
policemen and firemen, many driving cars with
stickers supporting Stokes' opponent, appeared
at polling places to challenge voters who were supposediy improperly registered. The majority went
to the Negro sections, where Stokes claims his
greatest strength. The officers had to be ordered
away from the polls by their commanders. 9 Four
days before the primary elections in Cleveland,
the Fraternal Order of Police took full-page ads in
the city newspapers condemning the mayor for
"refusing to respond" to the organization's suggestions for police improvement. Stokes and police
leaders, notably then Chief Patrick Gerity, have
dashed openly over administration attempts to
exercise control within the police department. °
"I talk to a lot of mayors in my work," Stokes
told one reporter of his problems with the police,
"and I find that the same problem is being faced
by mayors in New York, San Francisco, Bostonyou name it. It is just a little hotter in
Cleveland." n
The courthouse attack on the Black Panther
duo in New York involved many officers who were
wearing campaign buttons for presidential candidate George Wallace. Wallace's campaign seemed
to attract most of the police militants, and many
of those who, though not militant themselves,
sympathize with officers who are. New York Times
correspondent Ben A. Franklin wrote during the
1968 campaign on the policemen's attraction to
Wallace, and gave two minor, but significant, instances where acceptance of Wallace's beliefs led
uniformed officers to take politically motivated
actions.

One of these was in Hammond, Indiana, where
correspondent Franklin reported a middle aged
8Id. at 206-207.
9King, "Stokes Defeats Cleveland Rival," N.Y.
Times, Nov. 5, 1969, at 36.
10 Hess, "Stokes Challenger: Police Unit," Christian
Sci. Monitor, Oct. 30, 1969, at 12.
" Mayor Carl Stokes speaking to D. J. R. Bruckner
of Los Angeles Times, as quoted by Cray, The Politics"
of Blue Power, NAnON, April 21, 1969, at 493.
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couple sat high in a gallery at a Wallace rally,
away from the candidate's supporters. The couple
was causing no disturbance. But they were holding a small, hand-lettered sign reading "Dick
Gregory for President." Almost immediately, they
were escorted from the hall by a cadre of uniformed
officers. The other incident, in Louisville, Kentucky, found Mr. Wallace speaking to another
political rally. His commendation of Chicago police actions at the 1968 Democratic National Convention drew overwhelming response. But one
small "boo" drifted across the audience. "Policemen sprinted from every direction to the gallery
section from which the jarring sound had come,"
Franklin reported, "but were not immediately
able to pinpoint the troublemaker in the throng.
'Point him out to me,' one policeman commanded.
Fingers were pointed, and three cleanly dressed
teenagers, two boys and a girl, were paraded down
the aisle and out of Louisville's Freedom Hall to
a chorus of cheers and jeers." 12
Such action does not necessarily portend a
police state. But it is hardly reassuring. Would
those officers have responded the same to quiet,
orderly dissenters at rallies for candidate Eugene
McCarthy? If not, the patrolmen were using their
office to advance the interests of a political ideology, an action which has little place in a democracy.
Yet, the political activity of police officers has
continued to grow. In Detroit, officers contributed
money and off-duty time to advance the mayoral
campaign of Wayne County Sheriff Roman Gribbs.
White police campaigned in Los Angeles for Mayor
Sam Yorty. Minneapolis police hit the campaign
circuit for Charles Stenvig, a detective turned
mayor. Some Pittsburgh officers had to be told to
remove from their patrol cars bumper stickers
supporting Eugene Coon, a former assistant superintendent of police running for county sheriff. 2
While these incidents of police militancy are
fairly recent, perhaps their roots are not. Six years
ago, John H. Rousselot, the national public relations director of the John Birch Society, claimed
that extremist group had members in the police
department of all principal cities in the United
4
States.1
12 Franklin, "Wallace Hailed by Police on Tour,"
N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1968, at 78.
13Glickman, "Police in Many Cities Shed Nonpartisan Role for Active Politicking," Wall
Journal, Oct. 30, 1969, at 1.
14Weart, "Bircher Defends Enlisting Police,"
N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 1964, at 21.
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The militant officer spoken of so far is of the
political or ideological bent and almost certain to
be Caucasian. But there is another type of militant officer who was first reported only recently.
Administrators must be equally aware of his emergence. He is the black militant officer, whose militancy is directed at the white policeman. New York
Times reporter John Darnton puts this officer in
perspective:
In many cities the gulf has widened as blacks
have withdrawn from traditional police organizations to form their own. Virtually every major city
now has a black policeman's organization.
'We don't meet as policemen. We meet as members of the black community,' explained Mr.
[Leonard] Weir of the Society of Afro-American
Policemen. Mr. Weir's group, founded in 1965,
now has chapters in Newark, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit. Its headquarters is in New York.
The society's younger, more militant officers are
currently challenging the leadership of the Council
of Police Societies, which was formed in 1960 and
has 22 chapters.
But Mr. Weir still scoffs at black policemen in
general, even those who join black organizations.
'They're all mouth and no action,' he said. 'I don't
want to hear the talk. I want to hear the thunder.
I want to see the lightning.'15
The full impact of the black police organization
cannot be assessed at present. They may become
black pride groups and advance their departments
through recruitment of black officers and improvement of community relations in black areas. Or
they may become black militants with power no
black activists have had before.
The existence of the militant policeman has been
established in a few specific instances. How far has
he gone, what has he done, why does he do it? The
report of Jerome H. Skolnick, a professor at the
University of California at Berkeley, to the National Commission of the Causes and Prevention
of Violence, explores these matters in a full chapter, "The Police in Protest." For example:
The police tend to view themselves as society's
experts in the determination of guilt and apprehension of guilty persons. Because they also see themselves as an abused and misunderstood minority,
they are particularly sensitive to what they perceive as challenges to 'their' system of criminal
justice-whether by unruly Black Panthers or
'misguided' judges.' 6
1 Darnton, "Color Line a Key Police Problem,"
N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1969, at 1.
16 SicoL~MCK, supra note 7, at 212.
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Police organizations such as the Patrolmen's
Benevolent Association, conceived of originally as
combining the function of a trade union and lobbying organization for police benefits, are becoming
vehicles for the political sentiments and aspirations of the police rank and file, as well as a rallying
point for organized opposition to higher police and
civilian authority. 7
Throughout the chapter, various conclusions
are drawn by Dr. Skolnick and his staff. A summary of the implications of the Skolnick report
was contained in an interpretive article by John
Herbers published in the New York Times shortly
after the report came out. Herbers' article dealt
only with the one chapter on police activism:
Aepoliticizationof thepolice has gone so far, the
Skolnick report concludes, that in many cities and
states the police lobby rivals even elected officials in
influence and that the militancy of the police seems
to have 'exceeded reasonable bounds.'
Another factor, which some find equally disturbing, is the degree of public acceptance of the police
lobby and alleged police excesses....
Law enforcement officers from J. Edgar Hoover
down to the cop on the beat tend to equate protest
with subversion, the Skolnick report asserts, and
Mr. Hoover is among those blamed for spreading
this view, by repeating endlessly that Communists
are at the forefront of a number of mass protests
that have emerged in recent years. Thus, instead of
the police being a neutral force maintaining the
peace without fear or favor at the discretion of
civil authority, they have become, the report suggests, highly partisan militants with the narrowest
conception of social deviance, however legal. s
In city after city, from Boston to Los Angeles, the
police are bringing pressure on the regular political
institutions ranging from organized support of
political candidates to lobbying in state legislatures
for broadening the areas in which police may use
deadly force. The report cited one survey which
found the police are 'coming to see themselves as
the political force by which radicalism, student
demonstrations and black power can be blocked.' '9
What motivates the militant policeman is not
yet fully known for -there have been few studies
and none involving exhaustive research-the problem is too new. But from what little has been writ17Id. at 210.
18Herbers, "A Charge That Police Are Now Too
'Political,"' N.Y. Times, June 15, 1969, § 4, at 2.
19Id. The inner quote is from the original study,
not from the Skolnick report. see SnorLncK, supranote
7, at 210.

ten on the problem, and from the papers dealing
with subjects roughly analogous to police militancy, one may conclude that the alienation of
police from the society they serve is held by all as
a common cause. The three views following, each
in a different sense, present the view that the policeman is isolated and somewhat alienated from
those he is supposed to serve. This alienation
leads to frustration and a common antagonism toward the public. When the officer attempts to rebuild the ego that is constantly subjected to rebuffs and indignities, his idealism can gradually
degenerate into an ethnocentric view of society
in general and the system of justice in. particular.
When that mental attitude develops, and is seen
in context with the very nature of the policeman's
job, militancy can be seen as a not impossible result.
Hans Toch, professor of psychology at the
School of Criminal Justice at the State University
of New York at Albany, treats the problem head
on in an article dealing with militant blacks versus
militant police. His views can be generally applied
to militant policemen.
Militant police officers-like militant blacksreact with the premise that they canno longer operate within the system. They feel that, to make
themselves heard and respected, they must by-pass
the strictures imposed by an insensitive, or even
malevolent, power structure. In a sense, this goes
beyond the routine gambit of positive minorityism.
It represents a super-defensive reaction, which
arises when standard group defenses fail. It is found
among those members of a minority-mainly
the young-who sense behind the self-delusion of
their fellows an unresolved, permanent impotence.
What they demand is removal of social institutions
that enforce impotence; these, unfortunately, may
include competing minorities. 0
It would be bad enough if militant minorities
presented problems for their own kind, but the
threats they pose extend to non-militants, and to
the public at large. No one can speak up to a Blue
Power officer without implicating the police as an
institution. Anything less than assent to omnipotence becomes an affront to 'the law.' In turn,
anything the officer does.., becomes an act of
'law enforcement.' Disagreeing with a militant
officer lays one open to the accusation of being
motivated by perversity, prejudice and incipient
anarchism. For his part, the officer feels perpetually
20Toch,

Cops and Blacks: Warring Minorities,

NATION, April 21, 1969, at 491.
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persecuted, in that again and again, as he bumbles
his way through his awkward personal encounters,
the social order appears subjected to unbearable
contempt. This leads to cumulative bitterness and
increased militancy. When bluff and bluster achieve
nothing, it follows that the blame must lie elsewhere. Personal impotence is attributed to national
'criminal coddling.' The officer feels 'handcuffed,'
not by his own behavior, but by bleeding-heart
21
judges and politically motivated civilians.
Columbia University Professor Robert M.
Fogelson has analyzed a related problem, police
violence as a contributing factor in the riots of the
1960's. Though violence is his central concern,
part of his analysis is applicable to militancy.
To begin with, the police feel profoundly isolated
from a public which, in their view, is at best apathetic and at worst hostile, too solicitous of the
criminal and too critical of the patrolman. They
also believe that they have been given a job to do
but deprived of the power to do it. Excessive force
is a way to even the score. Moreover, the police,
who in America are regarded as employees of the
taxpayer rather than as representatives of the law,
do not receive the deference accorded them in most
Western European countries. Held in such low
esteem that they cannot command respect merely
by virtue of their position, they must rely on a
personal, as opposed to a professional claim to
authority. They must be tough. This sense of isolation and absence of respect render it difficult,
if not impossible, for most American policemen to
maintain law and order and at the same time abide
by a policy of minimal physical force.n
A large majority of them are convinced that it is
harder to maintain public order today than ever
before, that the criminals are more active, the
public less cooperative, and the courts too lenient.
For these reasons the police vigorously assert their
authority and otherwise intensify their surveillance
in high-crime neighborhoods; only by these means,
they assume, can patrolmen insure due respect for
the police and reduce the opportunities for crime.
And though the police argue that the public should
approve, and indeed trust that all law-abiding
citizens will do so, they do not consider public
approval essential.n
Sociologist William A. Westley also wrote about
the problem of police violence, but almost twenty
2
1Id. at 492.
22 Fogelson, From Resentment to Confrontation: The
Police, the Negroes, and the Outbreak of the 1960's
Riots, POL. Sci. Q. 224-225. (June 1968).
2Id.
at 230.
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years ago. Ideas presented by Fogelson and Toch
are similar to those of Westley, and suggest the
frightening possibility that, since 1953, things have
not changed much-at least for the better-in
bringing the police to a harmonious relationship
with the public. In 1953, Dr. Westley noted:
The policeman finds his most pressing problems
in his relations to the public. His is a service occupation, but of an incongruous kind, since he must
discipline those whom he serves. He is regarded as
corrupt and inefficient by, and meets with hostility
and criticism from, the public. He regards the
public as his enemy, feels his occupation to be in
conflict with the community, and regards himself
to be a pariah. The experience and the feeling give
rise to a collective emphasis on secrecy, an attempt
to coerce respect from the public, and a belief that
almost any means are legitimate in completing an
important arrest. These are for the policeman basic
occupational values. They arise from his experience, take precedence over his legal responsibilities,
are central to an understanding of his conduct,
and form the occupational24contexts within which
violence gains its meaning.
The existence of such goals and patterns of conduct (independent of and taking precedence over
his legal mandate) indicates the policeman has
and inmade of his occupation a preoccupation
25
vested in it a large aspect of his self.

What can be done about the militant policeman? At the outset there is the principle expressed
in a New York Times editorial that the police are
entitled to all the rights and privileges of any
citizen, particularly in his off-duty hours. In essence, the police can do anything anyone else can
do, but no more.26 But such principle does not
solve the problem; the old political dictum that
one must not only be honest, but must also appear
honest, can be applied to political or ideological
actions of the police. When the police take on an
aura of partisanship, whether deserved or not,
their value to the public is lessened.
Harried police and public officials might turn to
the news media for a useful guideline, Most quality
newspapers try scrupulously to keep reporters
from revealing any hint of partisanship in news
writing. In fact, many newspapers flatly forbid
their reporters from taking part in any political
T
24Westey, Violence and the Police, 59 AmE
35 (1953).
Socor.oGY,
25
Id. at 41.

26 "One Law For All" (editorial), N.Y. Times, Sept.
7, 1968, at 28.
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campaign except where their identity as newspaper reporters can reasonably be expected to be
unknown, and then only in a spectator's role, not
as a participant.
It may be said that objectivity is more important to newspapers than police, since the media
are the public's source of supposedly unbiased information. On the other hand, if the public does
not agree with one newspaper or television station,
there are usually others they may patronize. But
there is only one local police force to serve the
highly diverse factions of society. So the police
must not be allowed to select, or appear to select,
who they will or will not serve.
The concept that the impression as well as the
fact of political bias must be removed from the
police is only slightly more extreme than notions
expressed in the conclusion of the Skolnick report:
So, while the police may be analogous to other
government employees or to members of the armed
forces, they are also, and perhaps more importantly, analogous to the judiciary. Each interprets
the legal order to and imposes the legal on the population, and thus the actions of each are expected to
be neutral and non-political. In the case of the
judiciary, there is a strong tradition of removing
them from the partisan political arena lest their
involvement impede the functioning of the system.2 7
Dr. William P. Brown, a former inspector of
the New York City Police Department and now,
like Dr. Toch, a Professor at the School of Criminal Justice at the State University of New York
at Albany, sees the need for a re-orientation of
the police to meet the ambiguous and changing
situations confronting them.
We know most of the answers in terms of attitude changes and of practical working devices
which could help the police to gain... recognition.
We know that they face situations in which, in
contrast to the Western sheriff model which has
always characterized their own image of their
7

SoLNIcK, supra note 7, at 214.

work, they are not expected to emerge immediately
victorious or die trying. They must also recognize
that the high standard of individual rights which
the Supreme Court has enunciated is not just an
impediment to their work, but actually a call for a
higher standard of work which will bring with it
social recognition that they are performing at a
higher professional level.
The need is... to meet a standard of performance under difficulties which we could not even
have visualized a few years ago. Above all, they
must develop a faith that if they do perform at
this level, they will eventually win the support
that can make their future job possible. 2
The solution is far from crystal clear. However,
there are steps which should be taken. The administrator must move to break down the walls
which form between the police and the public.
Community relations units are one step, if they
are properly staffed, directed and sanctioned.
Implementing a review board or other means to
objectively air citizen grievances, is another if accepted by officers as distinct from a board of inquisition. Restricting policemen from partisan
political activity under conditions where they
would be representing themselves as officers is a
third. But probably the most important step is
instruction and the "tone" of each force. Every
officer must be convinced that service is his primary function, and that society's deviants and
rebels are as deserving as society's leaders. The
officer on the line must be willing to serve all
equally regardless of political persuasion or personal conviction. He must be convinced that this
is what his superiors sincerely want.
The police militant movement, as has been
stated, involves a tiny minority. The police militant must not be allowed to recruit others, and
those active now, in a negative sense, must either
be reformed or removed. For if the police militant
ever gains prominence, we will no longer have a
police force. We will have the vanguard of a police
state.
2
1Brown, Mirrors of Prejudice, NATION, April 21,
1969, at 499-500.

